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TAXATION-FEDERAL INcoME TAX-EXTENT To WmCH A DIVIDEND IN 
KINn 1s OimINARY INCOME UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CoDE1-Taxpayer, a 
corpo_rate shareholder, received from the corporation a distribution of property 
which had appreciated in value over its adjusted cost. The earnings and profits of 
the corporation were sufficient to cover the adjusted cost of the property distrib-
uted, but were not sufficient to cover its full fair market value at the time of dis-
tribution. The Tax Court held that the fair market value of the distribution was 
taxable as a dividend only to the extent of the corporation's earnings and profits. 
On appeal, held, reversed. In determining whether a distribution in kind is a 
dividend under section 115(a), the earnings and profits of the corporation are 
to be charged with the adjusted basis of the property distributed, without regard 
to any unrealized appreciation in its value. Since the corporation's earnings 
and profits were sufficient to cover the adjusted cost of the property herein 
distributed, the entire distribution is a dividend, and is taxable, under section 
115(j), to the full extent of its fair market value at the time of distribution. 
Commissioner 11. Hirshon Trust, (2d Cir. 1954) 213 F. (2d) 523; Commissioner 
11. Godley's Estate, (3d Cir. 1954) 213 F. (2d) 529. 
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as under the 1939 code, distribu-
tions of property by a corporation to its shareholders constitute dividends, taxable 
to the latter as ordinary income, provided that the corporation has earnings and 
profits sufficient to cover the distribution at the close of the taxable year in 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to code provisions in the text are references 
to the 1939 code. 
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which it is made.2 If a given distribution is a dividend in kind, it is gross 
income to the shareholder in an amount equal to its fair market value.3 The 
problem presented by the principal case, however, has been the subject of dis-
agreement among the courts. Its solution turns upon whether sections I IS(a) 
and (b), which determine the character of a distribution, also determine the 
extent to which a dividend in kind is subject to dividend taxation. Until quite 
recently, the courts generally have held that that portion of the fair market value 
of the property distributed which is in excess of the corporation's earnings and 
profits should first be applied to reduce the basis of the distributee's stock, any 
balance being taxable as a capital gain.4 These cases rest upon the theory that 
sections 115(a) and (b) not only determine the character of the distribution, 
but also measure the extent to which a dividend in kind is ordinary income. 
This analysis proceeds as follows: (1) there can be a taxable dividend only to 
the extent that earnings and profits are available for distribution in the taxable 
year;5 (2) unrealized appreciation over cost of the distributed property does not 
constitute earnings and profits to the distributing corporation;6 (3) since un-
realized appreciation in the value of the property distributed is excluded in 
measuring the corporation's earnings and profits for the purpose of determining 
the extent to which the distribution is a dividend, it likewise should be excluded 
in determining how much of the distribution is subject to dividend taxation.7 
The better view, however, would appear to be that propounded in the principal 
cases. Where the earnings and profits of the distributing corporation are suffi-
cient to cover the adjusted cost of the property distributed, the distributee is 
taxable under section 115(j) upon the full fair market value of the property 
distributed, notwithstanding the earnings and profits of the distributing corpora-
tion are insufficient to cover its appreciation in value over cost.8 These cases 
rest upon the theory that for purposes of characterizing a distribution as a 
dividend, the sole relevant test is from the standpoint of the distributing corpora-
tion, and from that standpoint the fair market value of the property distributed 
2 I.R.C. (1939), §§22(a), 115(a) and (b); I.R.C. (1954), §§301, 316(a). 
a I.R.C. (1939), §1150); I.R.C. (1954), §30l(b). 
4 I.R.C. (1939), §115(d); R. D. Merrill Co., 4 T.C. 955 (1945); Jane Easton Bradley, 
9 T.C. 115 (1947); Paulina du Pont Dean, 9 T.C. 256 (1947. National Carbon Co., 
2 T.C. 57 (1943), by implication upholds this view. Commissioner v. Timken, (6th Cir. 
1944) 141 F. (2d) 625, is also cited for this proposition, although it does not actually so 
hold. Cf. Raum, "Dividends in Kind: Their Tax Aspects," 63 HARv. L. REv. 593 at 
608 (1950). 
5 I.R.C. (1939), §§115(a) and (b); R. D. Merrill Co., note 4 supra; Jane Easton 
Bradley, note 4 supra; Paulina du Pont Dean, note 4 supra. 
6 General Utilities and Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 56 S.Ct. 185 
(1935); Jane Easton Bradley, note 4 supra; Paulina du Pont Dean, note 4 supra. 
7 Jane Easton Bradley, note 4 supra; Paulina du Pont Dean, note 4 supra. 
8 See Binzel v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 989, cert. den. 296 U.S. 
579, 56 S.Ct. 90 (1935); Commissioner v. Wakefield, (6th Cir. 1943) 139 F. (2d) 280; 
Equitable Securities Corp. v. United States, (D.C. Tenn. 1954) 122 F. Supp. 722. 
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is immaterial.9 Therefore, if earnings and profits of the distributing corporation 
are sufficient to cover the adjusted cost of the property distributed, the entire 
distribution is a dividend. Once it is determined, however, that the distribution 
is a dividend, its amount is governed solely by section 115(j), and for that 
purpose the earnings and profits of the corporation are immaterial.10 Since 
section l 15(j) is simply a valuation provision which is applicable only after it is 
determined that a given distribution is a dividend, it would appear that sections 
115(a) and (b) do not determine the extent to which a dividend in kind is 
ordinary income. If such were the case, section 115(j) would be superfluous. 
Under the 1954 code, however, the provision defining a dividend in kind11 
may be interpreted to determine the extent to which a dividend in kind is 
ordinary income. Whereas the 1939 code first defines a dividend in kind12 
and then provides for its valuation,18 the 1954 code first provides for a determina-
tion of the amount for the distribution14 and then provided that that portion 
of the distribution which is a dividend shall be included in gross income.15 
Under the new code, therefore, it could be said that only that portion of the 
distribution which may be charged against the corporation's earnings and profits 
is taxable as a dividend.16 Since under the new code only the adjusted basis of 
the property distributed may be charged against the earnings and profits of the 
corporation, 17 unrealized appreciation in the value of such property may be said 
to be taxable as a dividend only to the extent that there are earnings or profits 
from other sources sufficient to cover it.18 It must be noted, however, that the 
language of section 30l(c)(I), I.R.C. (1954), does not preclude the courts 
from applying the theory applied in the principal cases if they so desire. 
Alice Austin, S.Ed. 
9 Since unrealized appreciation in value of corporate assets may not be added to earn-
ings and profits (General Utilities and Operating Co. v. Helvering, note 6 supra) in deter-
mining whether a distribution in kind is a dividend under §ll5(a), I.R.C. (1939), it may 
not be subtracted therefrom. Cf. Raum, "Dividends in Kind: Their Tax Aspects," 63 
HAnv. L. REv. 593 at 609 (1950). 
10 Ibid. 
llJ.R.C. (1954), §316(a). 
121.R.C. (1939), §§ll5(a) and (b). 
1s I.R.C. (1939), §ll5(j). 
14 I.R.C. (1954), §301(b)(l). 
15 I.R.C. (1954), §301(c)(I). 
16Jn this connection, see proposed Treas. Reg. §1.301-l(a), 19 Fl!D. REG. 8237 (Dec. 
11, 1954). 
11 I.R.C. (1954), §312(a)(3). 
is I.R.C. (1954), §316(a); National Carbon Co., note 4 supra. 
